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Inferring emotion from amygdala activation alone is problematic
Commentary on Cook et al. on Dog Jealousy

Thomas F. Denson
School of Psychology, University of New South Wales
Abstract: Cook et al. investigated neural responses in domestic dogs in an experiment
designed to elicit jealousy. Relative to a control condition, watching the dogs’ caregivers feed
a fake dog activated the amygdala bilaterally. Dogs rated higher in dog-directed aggressiveness
showed larger initial amygdala activation. Amygdala activity in this context is insufficient
evidence to infer that the dogs experienced jealousy or even negative affect. The experimental
design does not provide an adequate level of control to infer the presence of jealousy.
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Jealousy, anger, and aggressive behavior may strain human-canine relations. Thus, research
into understanding the emotional lives of domestic dogs will likely improve human-canine
interactions and is therefore an important endeavor. In a very clever experiment, Cook et al.
(2018) have conducted an investigation into the neural correlates of jealousy in dogs. Using
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), 13 domestic dogs were trained for the MRI
environment and completed three runs of three trial types: dog receives food, dog sees fake
dog get food, and dog sees food deposited in a bucket (i.e., no one gets food). Analyses
focused on the dog-directed aggression scale of the Canine Behavioral Assessment and
Research Questionnaire (C-BARQ) as an additional predictor of BOLD responses in the bilateral
amygdala.
Despite my enthusiasm for the topic and the general aims of this research, the claims
are not justified by theory or the data. On a theoretical level, it seems unlikely that dogs
experience jealousy in the same way humans do, if at all. Dogs certainly experience happiness,
fear, anger, disgust, surprise, and sadness, which belong to a class of emotions known as basic
emotions (Ekman, 1992). These six emotions are shared with many mammalian species.
However, jealousy is part of a class of emotions known as self-conscious emotions or social
emotions (Tangney & Salovey, 1999). These emotions are generally thought to be restricted
to the human experience because they require higher-order abstract cognition such as theory
of mind, complex cognitive appraisals, and attributions. Similarly, in human laboratory
experiments, jealousy is invoked by threatened self-esteem (DeSteno, Valdesolo, & Bartlett,
2006). Dogs would require self-consciousness to experience a similar pathway to jealousy.
Examining just one brain structure, the amygdala, is highly unlikely to provide evidence
for any specific emotional experience. The authors are right to qualify their findings by noting
that amygdala responsivity is not isomorphic with any specific emotional experience. A meta-
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analysis of human neuroimaging studies showed that all emotional stimuli increased amygdala
activation, including positive emotions (Costafreda, Brammer, & David, & Fu, 2008). Thus, the
amygdala can be viewed more as a brain structure that responds to stimuli with emotional
relevance regardless of emotional valence. With that in mind, examining only the amygdala is
insufficient to make claims about jealously. Based on amygdala activity alone, it is equally
possible to claim that the dogs were happy or sad to see the fake dog get a treat, or that they
simply found that condition more emotionally relevant than the others without experiencing
any emotion at all.
Neuroimaging in humans has become increasingly detailed in its description of brain
networks involved in different emotions. During these early days of research into emotions
and the brain in dogs, an exploratory whole-brain analysis could be helpful in guiding future
research and so could functional connectivity analyses. Future work could examine more
widespread brain networks activated during emotions of interest to make stronger claims
about the emotional experiences of dogs.
My assessment of this research is aligned with that of Vonk (2018), who suggested that
more evidence with additional control conditions is needed before one can ascribe jealousy
to dogs. The authors did not provide any convincing data on whether the subjects actually
perceived the fake dog to be real. An unmoving statue that smells like another dog could be
perceived as strange and hence threatening in its own right initially. In fact, the dogs who were
rated highest on the C-BARQ aggression measure (i.e., those dogs highest in threat sensitivity)
showed the largest amygdala habituation response. This finding suggests that they may have
quickly figured out the charade. The finding that no dogs showed any aggression toward the
fake dog is also consistent with this possibility. Jealousy is a robust elicitor of aggression in
humans.
Assuming that the subjects did indeed perceive the fake dog as real, the experiment
requires a control condition in which the fake dog is fed by someone other than the caregiver.
Such a condition would reflect the emotion of envy in humans (e.g., coveting what someone
else has). If something akin to a jealousy response is elicited, one should only see relevant
BOLD responses in the caregiver condition. If relevant neural responses are observed in both
conditions, the result is probably more indicative of intraspecific resource competition (e.g.,
something more akin to envy). The current design does not distinguish between these two
possibilities.
One is left with the difficult problem of how to detect jealousy in dogs, if it exists.
Detecting jealousy nonverbally is not easy in humans. Unlike basic emotions, jealousy does
not have a universal facial expression. The only reliable method with people is to ask — and
even then, humans must be willing and able to report their emotional experience. To date,
there is no strong evidence for a unique pattern of brain activity during experienced jealousy,
suggesting that finding the neural correlates of jealousy in dogs may take some time.
A final issue is that five of the 13 dogs had the lowest aggression score possible. Thus,
the results rest on just 8 dogs. Replication and extension with a larger sample is warranted.
In sum, this experiment is part of growing methodological advances taking place in dog
imaging, and I commend the authors for the effort. Learning as much as we can about the
emotional lives of domestic dogs will no doubt improve human-canine relations and canine
welfare.
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